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The Future of Legal Scholarship and Scholarly Communication:  
Publication in the Age of Cyberspace  
by  
David A. Rier*  
There is a saying in the personal computer trade: "You can have it faster, cheaper, 
betterpick any two." This axiom comes to mind when confronting how technology is 
redefining the publication process, more rapidly than we may realize. These changes may 
well make academic publication faster and cheaper. But given some of the tradeoffs 
involved, it is less clear that these changes always make publication better, as well.  
In a recent paper (distributed electronically, in exemplification of the trends it discusses), 
Professor Bernard Hibbitts1 examines the revolutionary potential of new technology for 
revisingindeed, supplantingwhat has been one of the most tradition-bound of scholarly 
endeavors: the law review.  
In Part I of this paper, I will review the essentials of Hibbitts's discussion, and his 
argument that electronic self-publication of legal scholarship soon willand shouldreplace 
the edited, printed law review as we know it today. In Part II, I apply sociological 
analysis to explore some special features of the audience for and functions of legal 
scholarship. I will build upon this discussion in Part III, which explains why legal 
scholarship is a poor candidate for electronic self-publication, and why self-publication is 
a poor use of the Internet's potential for scholarly communication. In the concluding Part 
IV, I outline some counter-proposals for improving legal scholarship and scholarly 
communication in light of new dissemination technologies.  
I. The Hibbitts Proposal  
Because later in this article I will be compelled vigorously to disagree with certain of the 
recommendations Professor Hibbitts offers, it is pleasing to begin on a happier note. I 
thus hasten to applaud him for confronting the changes which legal scholarship is likely 
to face in coming years as a result of the rapid advances in computerized communication.  
Beyond this overall achievement, his paper is also valuable for reminding us that even an 
apparently inevitable, seemingly-permanent institution such as the law review isalong 
with scientific publication in general,2 the experimental physics journal in particular,3 (as 
well, indeed, as the bicycle4 and the machine gun5)actually the product of a certain era, 
representing a confluence of institutional and technological factors. For the law review, 
according to Hibbitts, chief among the institutional pressures were the desires of law 
faculty to: 1) give their students the legal training needed to secure them good jobs; 2) 
strengthen their standing, and that of their school, among the practicing bar; 3) improve 
ties to alumni, both to strengthen their schools' financial bases and improve job 
placement of graduates; and 4) improve their academic status within the university, at a 
time when the German model of the research university was growing more influential. 
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The rapid growth of law reviews is partly explained by their ability to play all of these 
roles, in addition to serving a gatekeeping function, giving professors a way to identify 
their top students for recruiting employers. Finally, of course, law reviews offered a 
means of communication among practitioners, and, by serving as a law digest, helped 
them keep track of a growing volume of new legal material. Meanwhile, cheaper paper 
and faster printing technology made publishing much more efficient.  
However, as Hibbitts points out, law reviews early in the twentieth century were already 
being criticized for their redundancy, with calls for specialization surfacing periodically.6 
Indeed, Hibbitts shows that generations of users have condemned law reviews: for their 
length; their inept, over-aggressive editingand poor selection of articlesby inexperienced 
student editors; their failure to provide educational benefits to any students save a small 
elite; their failure to provide even these elite students with educational benefits worth the 
enormous investments of time involved; their lack of peer review or faculty supervision; 
their publication of too much mediocre, poorly-written scholarship; their publication 
backlogs; their overuse of footnotes; their lack of utility to practicing lawyers and judges; 
and their over-emphasis on a limited range of topics.  
Nevertheless, Hibbitts explains, law reviews have become even more important in recent 
decades. Growing publication pressures on faculty have made law reviews key 
gatekeepers in the selection, tenuring, and promotion of law professors.7 Meanwhile, 
however, as Hibbitts tells it, most attempted reforms have had only limited success.  
Hibbitts proposes tapping the power of the ongoing revolution in computer 
communication to address the current woes of legal scholarship. Pointing to the power of 
LEXIS and WESTLAW, he describes how these servicesquite apart from their influence 
on other areas of legal researchhave tended to make use of law reviews easier, faster, 
cheaper.8 By offering the full text of published articles, these tools relieve scholars of 
their need to find the actual printed, bound volume on the shelves. Indeed, scholars do 
not, strictly speaking, need to depend nearly so much on the library itself. They can "dial 
up" the law reviews from their own living room, at any hour of the day or night. 
Moreover, the indexing capability speeds research by allowing rapid searching of law 
review material for key words. These databases also extend the potential read  
ership for articles beyond those with access to law libraries, or to subscribers of specific 
journals. They also offer the possibility of conserving scarce library funds by limiting 
subscriptions to printed and bound editions of law reviews. Finally, as Hibbitts point out, 
this technology permits analysis of the extent to which given articles are cited by 
subsequent pieces, as a proxy measure of the influence of the scholarship.  
For all this, though, Hibbitts observes that LEXIS and WESTLAW remain "conservative 
information technologies."9 As such, they do not go far enough. They fail to improve the 
selection and editing of articles, and do not end dependence on law reviews' publication 
schedules.  
Hibbitts passes quickly over the transitional phase in which numerous journalssome law 
reviews includedalready publish electronic versions to complement their traditional, 
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paper versions.10 He then discusses the possibility of avoiding paper publication entirely, 
by producing law reviews distributed solely electronically.11 Originally, this was done 
via electronic mail, but is now more often accomplished through the technically more-
advanced World Wide Web (Web), in which articles are placed in electronic archives 
which anyoneor multiple anyone's, simultaneouslymay visit with the proper address. By 
1995, indeed, four all-electronic law reviews had appeared.  
Since such journals are no longer encumbered by being originally produced for the print 
format, several advantages accrue. First, they could be much cheaper and faster to 
produce. According to Hibbitts, this diminished overhead of time, energy, and money 
also improves the odds that busy facultyin lieu of the present law studentscould 
eventually be lured into editing them.12 All-electronic journals ("e-journals") would also 
relieve libraries' burden of purchasing, cataloguing, and storing printed, bound journals. 
Simultaneously, they offer access to scholars lacking ready access to law libraries. Also, 
their independence from print format permits use of the technologies of multimedia and 
hypertext (discussed below) to enliven the text and ease subsequent research. The 
independence from print format also means, says Hibbitts, that editors would no longer 
be pressured to fill a set number of pages, and would not therefore have to accept and 
publish undeserving articles.13 Similarly, they can publish (i.e., archive electronically on 
a "Web-site") good articles immediately, without waiting until an "issue's worth" of 
appropriate material accumulates. The all-electronic format also makes subsequent 
updates and corrections of published material far easier. Moreover, Hibbitts states that 
post-publication feedback in the form of electronically-posted comments can be attached 
to articles to stimulate scholarly dialogue.14  
Does the law-review-as-e-journal, then, represent the future of legal scholarship, the 
remedy for the law review's many ills? Hibbitts thinks not.15 For one thing, he notes, law 
reviews have been slow to convert to pure e-journal format, and even current efforts in 
that direction fail to make best use of the format's potential. Hibbitts suggests that the 
inherent conservatism of student (and, potentially, faculty) editors, combined with 
faculty's lack of sufficient interest, time, and editorial and computer skills with which to 
assume the editorial burden, militates against rapid adoption of innovative forms of the e-
journal model. Also, Hibbitts states that even faculty-edited e-journals "are as vulnerable 
to intellectual capture and cooption as any print review."16  
So, if the pure e-journal is not the solution, what is? Hibbitts's radical answer is briefly 
stated: "In the age of cyberspace, law professors can finally escape the straitjacket of the 
law reviews by publishing their own scholarship directly on the World Wide Web."17 To 
Hibbitts, the case for letting professors thereby "take complete control of the production 
and dissemination of their own scholarly work" is "clear and strong."18 Harking back to 
the days before printed scholarly journals appeared in the seventeenth century, Hibbitts 
observes that scholars once communicated new research findings by writing directly to 
one another.19 With the development of the scholarly journal, scholars forfeited some of 
their autonomy, being compelled to cede control over selection and editing of material in 
order to achieve wider, faster dissemination. To Hibbitts, such compromise has been 
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rendered obsolete by Web technology: the best way to respond to the delays, errors, and 
biases of edited journals, in other words, is to circumvent editors and journals altogether.  
In the self-publication world Hibbitts envisions, law professors could write what they 
chose, in the style or format they chose, without worrying about editors being biased in 
their selection of articles or incompetently meddling in their editing. Upon finishing an 
article, an author could instantly "publish" it by depositing it, electronically, in an archive 
under their own "Web page," immediately available to anyone with access to a computer, 
modem, and the electronic "address" of the Web page. Authors also could repeatedly 
revise and correct their "publications." Hypertext technology allows readers almost 
instantly to retrieve related information. Thus, rather than merely reading a citation to 
another article, or to a certain circuit court decision, one could skip ("link") right to the 
full text of that material. Indeed, this could render obsolete the current (and widely 
disliked) obsession with the intricacies of the infamous Bluebook citation format. 
Another advantage is that Web articles could use multimedia to include non-print, audio-
visual material, such as clips of actual court testimony, as parts of the article itself. 
Indeed, authors could "publish" clips of themselves speaking, thereby diminishing 
boundaries between teaching and scholarship. Also, Hibbitts observes that readers could 
e-mail their comments directly to the author; this feedback could spark rapid revisions, or 
could be appended to the published document, for later readers to view the thread of 
"post-publication" debate.20  
II. The Anomalous Position of Legal Scholarship:  
Audience and Function  
Before assessing the suitability of legal scholarship for self-publication, we must examine 
certain special features of the audience for and function of the law review literature.21 
First, it will be recalled that I lauded Hibbitts for explaining the creation and development 
of law reviews as resulting from a conjunction of institutional and technological factors. 
In short, law reviews arose and flourished because they served various needs (and 
because the enabling technology was in place). What about today? What institutional 
pressures drive the production and publication of legal scholarship?  
This question is best answered with the aid of some handy sociological terms, and a 
comparison of legal and scientific publication. First the terms. Building on earlier work 
by anthropologists and other sociologists, sociologist Robert K. Merton explained that 
social activities or institutions can fulfill both manifest and latent functions.22 Manifest 
functions are explicit, acknowledged by participants as the main reason for the activity. 
Yet the same activity might simultaneously fulfill latent functions which, while valuable, 
are not necessarily planned or even recognized. Thus, the rain dances of Hopi Indians 
may not, in fact, fulfill their intended (manifest) function of bringing on rainyet they may 
fulfill the latent function of, say, reinforcing group identity.23  
What does a Hopi rain dance have to do with legal scholarship? Simply this: like the rain 
dance, law reviews have their manifest and latent functionsalthough not necessarily in the 
expected order.  
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Now, this distinction will become clearer after a discussion of publication in science, not 
law. First, the centrality of the journal to science is undeniable.24 Its purpose is also 
clear:  
The rapid communication of information is, of course, the most obvious function . . . . The 
need to exchange ideas is fundamental to the notion of science and scholarship operating 
as a community, in which the journal not only is a repository of completed work, but also 
is consulted by practitioners in all fields in order to learn of work in progress [emphasis 
added].25  
Does the law review occupy the same position? Does it exist primarily26 to convey 
information? Is it generally consulted by practitioners?  
Not exactly. True, as in science, "[s]cholarship is the door to promotion, tenure, and 
salary increases" in academic law.27 At the same time, however, one commentator 
claims that there are "no consumers of law reviews."28 Observers from other disciplines 
may be surprised at the frankness with which even defenders of law reviews, such as 
Dean Harold Havighurst, could admit that:  
law reviews are unique among publications in that they do not exist because of any large 
demand on the part of a reading public. Whereas most periodicals are published 
primarily in order that they may be read, the law reviews are published primarily in order 
that they may be written . . . the principal reason a law school publishes a review is not so 
much for the benefit of readers as for the benefit of writers [emphasis added].29  
Havighurst and others see the law review chiefly as an educational tool for training law 
students. It is worth stressing the singularity of this function. To the best of my 
knowledge, no other academic literature is ever defined as primarilyor even largelya 
device for teaching students. Academics from other disciplines may thus be forgiven for 
protesting, "See, here! My students have to write term papers as part of their education, 
but I don't publish their papers and deposit them in libraries all over the country, do I? 
Why do you folks do it?"  
Actually, similar complaints have been voiced within the academic legal community. 
One law professor, while willing to acknowledge the benefits to law students, asked 
"Does student work need to be published in so expensive a fashion if it is only for their 
education?"30  
Another, inspired by the old Mission: Impossible television series, went so far as to 
suggest: "If, for training reasons, a law review is considered essential at a particular 
institution it would be a great boon to the profession if the bulk of its contents were 
printed on flash paper, scheduled to self-destruct as soon as the training mission is 
over."31  
However, it is not necessarily the writing, but rather the selection and editing, of legal 
scholarship which constitute the main benefits to students working on law reviewsand 
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which, according to some, stimulate the primary demand for the legal scholarship of 
others. Note the apparent inversion of what would normally be regarded as the manifest 
and latent functions of legal scholarship in this observation by Professor George L. Priest 
of Yale Law School:  
The demand for law review articles is dominated, not by consumption by readers or 
subscribers, but by consumption of student editors . . . . The principal demand for legal 
scholarship is not demand by readers, searching for insights; it is a demand by editors, 
searching for material to edit . . . . The benefits to readers of modern scholarship are 
secondary benefits; the primary benefit is as material upon which students may exercise 
editorial judgment, thus improving their skills and, in turn, the reputations of their law 
schools [emphasis added].32  
At least one law professor applies an explicit manifest/latent functional analysis:  
The anthropologist might note that law reviews are among the most inefficient 
institutions in Americabut only if we assume that their purpose is the publication of legal 
scholarship. They are quite efficient if we conceive of their purpose more  
broadly as permitting law students to promote and perform legal scholarship . . . .33  
Some see the educational role as primary, but as being accompanied by other, almost 
equally-important functionsall far more important than the ostensible manifest function of 
legal scholarship, conveying important knowledge to interested readers:  
Use of law reviews is a means to a pedagogical endthe training of students . . . . Its 
original goal of serving the profession seems but a curious anachronism . . . . Today, law 
reviews are seen as a training ground for nascent lawyers, a requisite law student ticket 
punch on the route to legal stardom, a primary vehicle for the professoriate to attain 
tenure if not academic stardom, and, oh yes, a service to the profession.34  
Other commentators focus on the academic reward system within which professors 
operate as the primary cause of their production of law review articles. Resulting 
weaknesses in the scholarship produced under such conditions are mitigated by the lack 
of a readership to be harmed thereby:  
Nowadays the goal of publication is much less to find answers than to avoid perishing in 
pursuit of promotion and tenure . . . . Could even a small percentage of this massive 
productivity (which law librarians privately label the Junk Stream) be worth readers' 
whiles? And, one must hasten to ask, what readers? Most reviews have very limited 
circulations, consisting primarily of libraries and alumni. Few in the latter group pay any 
attention to the esoteric titles appearing on the cover, much less to the contents inside. 
For all the work professors put into law review articles, one would think they'd be able to 
attract a larger audience than the sprinkling of colleagues who skim through off-prints out 
of courtesy or the handful of students who may wade through them because they've been 
assigned. Even fewer practicing attorneys read such secondary sources out of non-billable 
interest. [emphasis in original]35  
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Similarly,  
most professors simply do not have anything to write about. Many professors only write 
articles or books because they must do so in order to get tenure, promotions, and raises . . 
. . We do not need to worry about the consumers of law reviews because they really do 
not exist. A few professors who author texts must read some of the articles, but most 
volumes are purchased to decorate law school library shelves. The only purchasers of law 
reviews outside of academe are law firms which gladly pay for the volumes even though 
none reads them [emphasis added].36  
Readers may wonder at my reason for parading at such repetitive length these 
unflattering observations about legal scholarship.37 It is this: the cumulative weight of 
these comments casts serious doubt on the wisdom of Hibbitts's self-publication program. 
For these quotations indicate that, given the importance of legal scholarship as a learning 
experience for students, or a vehicle of professional advancement for faculty, what would 
normally be considered a latent function in most other disciplines is, in law, accepted as 
the manifest function.38  
This is worth pondering for a moment. For, to those from other disciplines, such sanguine 
acceptance of the relative lack of readership for an entire literature, as a whole, is 
remarkable.39 To be sure, it is extremely well understood in academic science that 
publication is essential to professional advancement, as measured by professional 
recognition, research grants and other resources, tenure, and promotion.40 As such, it is 
not surprising that tenure and promotion pressures are important spurs to scientific 
publication. In one recent study of toxic-exposure epidemiologists, for example, most 
investigators quite cheerfully admitted that these incentives figured prominently in their 
motivation to conduct and publish research41as did other factors, such as personal 
satisfaction and the chance to make an important contribution to the field.42 Indeed, the 
history of science offers several examples of even some of the most important discoveries 
being made by ambitious scientists who pursued glory and fame at least as hungrily as 
they did Truth.43  
However, seldom if ever would it occur to scientists that scientific work has no real 
readership, that it makes little contribution except strengthening their tenure cases. And 
certainly, scientists could not blithely accept that this doesn't make much difference. Of 
course, scientists are well aware that many papers are not, in fact, widely read44 or 
cited,45 and that much work is not high-quality.46  
However, scientists still accept that communication of meaningful (i.e., validated)47 
results to interested peers is the main (i.e., manifest) function of scientific publication, the 
"point" of the whole enterprise. As physicist John Ziman commented, "[u]ltimately, all 
our elaborate apparatus and skilled technicians exist only to add a few more pages to the 
books on the shelves" in the library.48 Scientists thus view the absence of readership for 
and citations to their work as undesirable in the extreme. Under such conditions, in other 
words, their primary goals are not met.  
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Well, so what? If legal scholars apparently tolerate a different order of priorities, fine. If 
they are (more or less) content that their publications secure them academic advancement 
(and give bright students editorial practice), and scarcely expect that these articles 
makeor are even intended to makegenuine contributions to the scholarly community, so 
be it.  
Perhaps. Yet certain other questions confront us. For instance, maybe this proves that the 
institutional reward system of academic law is seriously awry. Law schools need ways to 
identify faculty deserving of promotion and tenure. Surely, it is not coincidence that 
publication of legal scholarship, and not, say, professors' height or their ability to guess 
the num  
ber of jellybeans in a jar, emerged as the yardstick of faculty quality.  
One might normally assume that publication was originally chosen because law review 
articles were a direct contribution to the legal community. However, it appears that 
faculty publication was chosen, instead, for benefits rendered somewhat less directly to 
this community. In recent decades, elite law schools have been particularly interested in 
securing a more respected position in the wider scholarly community within their 
universities. To help live down their "trade school" image, they placed growing emphasis 
on faculty publicationthe primary currency in circulation in other departments of these 
universities.49 The increasing importance of publication at the more elite schools, in turn, 
has caused adoption of the same criterion at less elite schools, which seek improvements 
in their faculty's publication records (as measured by quantity and prestige of outlet) as a 
means towards higher ranking among law schools.50  
With such emphasis on publication of law review articles, law schools recapitulate their 
original embrace of the early law reviews, themselves, asinter aliaa tool for securing 
greater respect within the university.51  
In some ways, this reflects the tendency for classical professions such as law to 
emphasize their command over an abstract body of knowledge, grounded in dominant 
social values, as legitimization for their social authority and autonomy.52 Tellingly, one 
influential student of the professions states that "the true use of academic professional 
knowledge is less practical than symbolic."53  
However, law professors' quest for acceptance as "real scholars," which goal they pursue 
via adoption of an emphasis on scholarly publication, is actually more reminiscent of a 
somewhat differentbut analogoustrend. Ironically, this trend involves, not the classical 
("learned") professions, but occupations such as social work, nursing, and optometry, 
which aspired to achieve status as full-fledged professions. For such occupations 
correctly discerned the importance of abstract knowledge in justifying the power of 
classic professions. They therefore sought to codifyor createtheir own bodies of abstract 
knowledge as a way (amongst various others, such as adoption of codes of ethics 
emphasizing service to humanity54) to bolster their lobbying efforts for professional 
status55of which the professional research journals arebyproduct and symbol.  
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Much of what appeared above about law review scholarship becomes clearer when we 
recognize that, when an occupation is "on the make,"56 the content of the knowledge 
base is less important than its existence.57 I submit the startling conclusion thatto the 
extent that law schools have adopted the standard of scholarly publication as a means of 
aping the wider academic community from which they seek acceptance as peersthis 
powerful learned profession resembles an occupation on the make.58 This explains why 
academic law so struggles to cloak itself in the ill-fitting garments of a model not 
designed for its ostensible (manifest) needs. For the growing emphasis on scholarly 
publicationa system designed to convey important, validated information to interested 
consumersseems poorly suited to a field in such overt doubt that its scholarship even has 
a genuine audience. Thus, we have a situation in which "[l]egal scholars, most 
particularly of the elite variety, seem to be more interested in gaining acceptance as 
participants in the intellectual life of the university than in communicating with other law 
professors, judges, lawyers, or law students to improve the quality of the practice of 
law."59  
Overall, the real importance of legal scholarship seems to lie in its functions of teaching 
device, promotion criterion, and badge of identity as a scholarly discipline. What gets lost 
in all this? Content. For the system as it now operates seems, as one thoughtful observer 
states, precisely the "antithesis" of "tak[ing] scholarship seriously in its own right, as an 
end in itself . . . ."60  
A full discussion of the appropriate weights which teaching and writing should receive in 
promotion and tenure discussions lies well beyond the scope of the current article. 
However, perhaps elite law schools will one day be satisfied with their reputation 
amongst other disciplines within the university, and will feel less pressure to direct 
considerable energies towards production of additional scholarship whose value is 
primarily symbolic.61 When that day comes, perhaps theyand the lesser schools 
emulating themwill be ready to acknowledge that not allperhaps even fewprofessors are 
able to make genuine contributions to the literature,62 and will "let the writers be writers, 
the scholars scholars, teachers teachers . . . and give them credit accordingly."63  
III. Is Self Publication on the World-Wide-Web the Answer?  
Electronic publication offers some important advantages to legal scholarship. This is true 
whether or not we need take its possibilities quite so far as Hibbitts suggests in order to 
reap them (and I will argue below that we need not, and should not). Perhaps the most 
powerful advantage is sheer convenience. Anyone who has experienced the minor thrill 
of being able to download abstracts from one's living room, late on a weekend night, can 
appreciate the liberating power of the computer as a research tool. Now, with the current 
ease of recovering even the full text of a wide range of material, this is even more potent 
a benefit. For scholars who are also parents of pre-school children, elderly or disabled, or 
working in other disciplines, based at institutions lacking law libraries, such convenience 
can make the difference between productivity and unproductivity.  
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As Hibbitts rightly observes, no longer will scholars be blocked from access to an article 
by a volume's being in use  
or misfiled. No longer will scholars have to roam the study carrels of the library looking 
for that key volume. The entire scholarly community can read an article simultaneously, 
even when the libraries are closed.64 Also, users would no longer need to lug weighty 
tomes to the copy room, or fumble for quarters or copy cards. Those preferring not to 
read entire articles on computer screens can print their selections out, straight from the 
computer, to retain the portability, ease of annotation, and sheer familiarity of paper 
scholarship.  
Obviously, there is also the speed of bypassing the print shop and the post office, delays 
which can only add to the costs and detract from the timeliness of published legal 
scholarship. The cost argument is particularly important in times of tight budgets and 
rising costs of production, distribution, subscriptions, and storage.65  
The hypertext capabilities of electronic publication also have some powerful appeals for 
legal scholars. The ability instantly to retrieve articles and opinions cited in a law review 
article can save enormous amounts of time. In so doing, hypertext could conceivably 
encourage more careful, thorough research, as scholars can rapidly "follow the thread" of 
legal issues.66 Moreover, as Hibbitts rightly notes, the technologies of hypertext and 
multimedia can, by providing the original versions of cited material, reduce distortion:  
Individuals working in the legal system or otherwise involved in the legal process as 
judges, lawyers, clients, witnesses or family members will be heard and seen for 
themselves in legal scholarship, instead of being (re)presented and (mis)understood 
through the filter of words written on a page.67  
Such advantages seem compelling. However, it is critical to keep in mind that most are 
attainable through shifts towards electronic publication which stop well short of Hibbitts's 
"scorched earth" proposal to do away with editors and journals entirely.  
True, there is an appealing elegance to the concept of self- publication. In its purest form, 
after all, scholarly publication is merely a communication device:  
Why are we scholars if it is not to make a contribution to knowledge and inquiry? And 
surely that contribution is made only if we are read by and influence the work of our 
fellow scholars, present and future. The scholar/scientist, in other words, wants to reach 
his peers' eyeballs so as to influence the contents of their minds . . . .68  
Existing software already gives scholars the ability to do for themselves muchif not 
mostof the technical production work formerly available only from publishers and 
printers.69 By eliminating these middlemenalong with journals' editorial staffs, of 
courseself-publication would seem to provide the quickest means to achieving the central 
goal of communication to peers.  
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However, as might have been predicted based on the previous section, self-publication is 
particularly ill-suited to legal scholarship. Indeed, this section explores two fundamental 
flaws in the Hibbitts proposal. First, it constitutes a solution in search of a problem. 
Second, because Hibbitts both misunderstands the system of scholarly communication 
(and how it can put to best use the power of cyberspace), and neglects the continuing 
importance of the institutional pressures driving legal scholarship, his system would 
needlessly undermine the quality of legal scholarship, and would also face major 
obstacles to widespread adoption.  
A. Legal Scholarship as a Candidate for Web Self-Publication  
As suggested above, considerable savings of time and money are possible with electronic 
publication of legal scholarship. In the present context, however, the more radical step of 
self-publication on the Web (i.e., avoiding the law review altogether and lunging straight 
for the readers' eyeballs) seems to be necessary only if two conditions are met. One, that 
there exists a population of eager readers whose eyeballs hunger for legal 
scholarshipserved up instantly. And, two, that these eyeballs are currently being starved 
by biased, incompetent editors whoaided and abetted by their outmoded, cumbersome 
methods of disseminationkeep this vital scholarly nourishment from seeing the light of 
day.  
Material presented in Part II should disabuse us of the notion that hordes of potential 
consumers are begging for more law review articles, and the sooner the better. Thus, why 
all the fuss about new technologies to place, at lightning speed, legal scholarship in the 
hands of these non-existent consumers? Such innovation seems singularly wasted on 
legal scholarship. To paraphrase the title of a sociology of knowledge article, "[i]f instant 
dissemination is the solution, what is the problem?"70  
But what about the second condition? Is it true that, under the present system, fads, 
biases, or sheer ignorance on the part of editors wind up suppressing valuable 
scholarship? Here, too, the condition seems to go unfulfilled. First, editors typically insist 
that the distribution of topics represented by what they publish is a direct reflection of 
what they are submitted:  
[W]e publish what we get, and in more or less the same proportions in which we get it. 
This is not simply a matter of professors catering to our desires. If professors were not the 
source of most subject-matter bias, their writing would likely shift to different fields after 
they received tenure. Yet we have found that submissions from tenured professors 
continue to concentrate on corporate law, constitutional law, and other federal topics.71  
In other disciplines, similar claims are routinely made by seasoned faculty editors.72  
But suppose that Hibbitts is correct that editorial biases and fads do influence manuscript 
selection.73 This would still seem to pose few real obstacles to publication in an 
environment where authors can submit the same article to a score of journals 
simultaneouslyand where the market favors the seller. One observer remarks upon the 
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"huge excess capacity of the law review industry (hundreds of law reviews chasing a 
relatively small number of worthwhile articles) . . . ."74  
Similarly: "the redundancy of student journals does offer one safeguard: it is highly 
unlikely that any meritorious article will not get published somewhere."75 In fact, "[i]n 
what other field is publication of a tenure piece so easily possible?"76 Similarly, the 
redundancy of student journals does offer one safeguard: it is highly unlikely that any 
meritorious article will not get published somewhere.77  
This happy truth is no secret among authors. "[I]sn't it wonderful to have so many 
possible places to publish? With less prestigious publications crying for material, it is 
hard to imagine any manuscript, no matter how amateurishly done, failing to find a home 
eventually."78 Moreover, "[a]nother advantage of student editing is that we have many 
more journals than needed, giving us more places to publish."79  
There is also some empirical support for assertions that editorial biases cannot keep 
articles from being published. Based on data collected from interviews with senior law 
review editors at thirty-seven law schools (and on mailed responses from editors at 
another six), one study of editorial practices concluded that "the large number of law 
reviews ensures that interesting and persuasive ideas affecting and involving the legal 
system generally find expression in periodicals operating at appropriate levels of 
influence. If one journal's policies and procedures cause it to reject a meritorious work, 
another of roughly equal rank is likely to pick it up."80  
If anything, the problem is more likely in the opposite direction. "In the end, nearly all 
the good ones and far too many of the bad are published . . . ."81  
B. Scholarly Communication, Quality, and the Institutional Context  
According to Hibbitts, advances in technology give us the opportunity to circumvent 
fully what he regards as a hopelessly defective editorial system. Since, he argues, peer-
review as it exists in other disciplines is rare in legal scholarship, and since most journals 
continue to be run by students, not faculty, he sees little lost in dispensing with law 
reviews completely. We will see that this policy is needlessly radical, and harmful.  
1. Peer Review in Science  
A more fundamental problem, however, is Hibbitts's apparent misunderstanding of the 
value of scholarship and scholarly communication. Traditionally, the very purpose of 
science has been considered to be the production of "certified knowledge."82 Indeed, 
Crane claims that the peer-reviewed, published article's function as a "statement of 
knowledge that has been validated and found acceptable by peers" is actually more 
important than its presumptive role of simply transmitting information.83 What makes 
the paper so important is that, by the time it appears in a journal, the material contained 
within it has already withstood various institutional tests, or "critical evaluation[s]."84 
These evaluations may have included peer-review of the research question and 
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methodology by funding agencies, peer-review of the data and their interpretation for 
presentation of abstracts or papers to a conference, as well as comments and criticisms 
from the audiences of conferences or faculty seminars. Less formal stages might have 
included comments from colleagues who consented to read earlier drafts of the 
manuscript, or even fell into conversations over coffee.85  
However, by far the most significant stage is peer review by the journal:  
[T]he fundamental premise on which rests the crucial role of the journal in the research 
enterprise is the trust of the community in a process that results in the published journal 
article. Of course, this trust originates in the selection of only a few manuscripts from 
among the many submitted to the journal editor for consideration of publication. Review 
of the manuscripts by peers in the field who are qualified to judge the significance of the 
contribution has been the basis of the substantive role of the journal since its beginnings 
in the seventeenth century . . . . The peer review process that regulates the growth of 
knowledge . . . is essential to the quality of information as well as to the dialectic on 
which the scholarly communication system depends [emphasis added].86  
Indeed, "[t]he referee is the lynchpin about which the whole business of Science is 
pivoted."87  
One subtle advantage of peer review is that it can lead authors to internalize higher 
standards.88 Now, peer review surely has its critics. Of most relevance to our discussion 
is the complaint that reviewers may reject work which is later shown to be important.89 
However, here, too, there seems little risk that truly important papers languish 
unpublished for long:  
[I]n all fields virtually everything that is written gets published somewhere; in the social 
sciences a manuscript may be submitted to a succession of lower and lower standard 
journals until it finds its niche; in physics authors may head more directly for something 
within their reach the first time round . . . . There is not much risk that a truly valuable 
piece of work will fail to be published . . . .90  
Despite problems, the system seems to work, more or less, as it should.91 Harnad gets it 
just about right: "Like democ  
racy, it has imperfections, but it has no viable alternatives, whether on paper or on the 
electronic airwaves."92  
Given Hibbitts's willingness to dispense with peer review, it is interesting that Harnad, 
one of the most innovative figures in electronic publishing, so adamantly declares its 
importance:  
There is only one sector in which the Net will have to be traditional, and that is in the 
validation of scholarly ideas and findings by peer review. Refereeing can be implemented 
much more rapidly, equitably, and efficiently on the Net, but it cannot be dispensed with, 
as many naive enthusiasts (who equate it with "censorship") seem to think.93  
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Additional compelling evidence for the importance of peer review comes from the 
aftermath of Paul Ginsparg's creation of an electronic archive of high-energy physics 
articles, deposited as pre-prints prior to actual publication in a journal. As Hibbitts notes 
approvingly, the speed and cheapness of this system has helped it virtually to replace the 
formal journal as the primary channel of dissemination in its field. However, this is only 
half the story. Ginsparg and his colleaguesresponding to fears that electronic pre-print 
archives might destroy, along with the traditional journal, a very valuable system of peer 
reviewrecently began to investigate how to add a form of peer-review to the electronic 
archive system. They ended up planning a fully peer-reviewed, all-electronic journal, 
with a submission system integrated with that of the existing pre-print archive.94 
Ironically, John Ziman predicted over a quarter of a century ago that pre-print exchanges 
would wind up re-inventing both the journal and the referee.95  
2. Institutional Functions of Legal Scholarship, and the Implications for Adoption of Web 
Self-Publication  
Indeed, the following quotation, from a study (published on-line) assessing the adoption 
of electronic publication, hints at the reason for the importance of peer review to 
electronic publication: "Refereeing of some sort, it is widely regarded, will be 
indispensable if on-line journals are to claim large numbers of users."96  
This brings us to what Hibbitts forgot:  
The objective of those of us who have glimpsed this medium's full potential is to 
establish on the Net an electronic counterpart of the "prestige" hierarchy among learned 
paper journals in each discipline. Only then will serious scholars and scientists be ready 
to entrust their work to them, academic institutions ready to accord that work due credit, 
and readers able to find their way to it amidst the anarchic background noise [emphasis 
added].97  
While explaining well why publication once filled various functions for law professors 
and law schools, Hibbitts neglected to fully extend his analysis to the presentfor law 
reviews still do fulfill some of these functions. Proceeding from this fact, we will 
immediately see that Web self-publication would not fulfill one of the prime functions 
the legal academic community requires from its literature. It is this problem which poses 
perhaps the most serious obstacle to the adoption of Hibbitts's proposal.  
Hibbitts does recognize that self publication would deprive articles of the "halo effect" 
emanating from placement in a prestigious outlet.98 Yet he dismisses such an effect as 
unworthy of serious scholarship, and suggests that abandonment of the current system of 
publication could allow refocussing of the "attention of law professors on doing their 
scholarly work for its own sake, rather than playing the placement 'game.'"99 Now, it 
would be a fine thing indeed if articles were written for their own sake. But Web 
technology does not alter the fact that professors, especially those not yet tenured, can ill 
afford to "opt out" of a game that determines their professional fate. For surely, it is "the 
promotion and tenure process that drives the efforts of most legal writers."100 The true 
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audience is thus comprised primarily of deans and  
other members of tenure and promotion committees.101  
Here, it is worth observing that the scholarly analogue to the realtor's focus on "location, 
location, location" is . . . "location, location, location." Young faculty in a wide range of 
disciplines are routinely advised that the prestige of the journals in which their work 
appears will be scrutinized closely at tenure time.102 Indeed, this emphasis is why, as 
Hibbitts observes, it is "especially reviews at the elite schools"103 which today are 
swamped by manuscripts from hopeful authors, and why, as Hibbitts also mentions,104 
there exists the "tendency of law professors, lawyers and judges to cite, and more 
generally use, only a very few law reviews (essentially those from the 'elite' 
schools)."105  
This unequal distribution of prestige and influence is well understood, and is important to 
law schools in rewarding faculty production. Because of this, Hibbitts's proposal is truly 
ill-advised. For, if Hibbitts considers student editors, to say nothing of deans, etc., too 
conservative to embrace even e-publication of regular journals,106 how will deans give 
approval to self-publication, without prior review? To paraphrase Willy Loman, it is not 
enough to be publishedyou must be well-published (and certainly not self-published!).  
Now let us take the next step, and briefly consider the direct consequences for adoption 
of self-publication. It is true that lawyers and law scholars do not yet, as do their 
counterparts in science, rely heavily upon informal communication vía the Internet (about 
which, more below). However, as the current generation of studentswho may never have 
used a typewriter, who are already accustomed to corresponding (sans paper, envelopes, 
stamps, or delays longer than a minute or two) with their boyfriend in Ann Arbor, their 
brother in Seattle, and their parents in Fort Lauderdale through the Internetenters the legal 
academy, then wider adoption of other forms of electronic communication and on-line 
research are plausible  
next steps. Actually, this is already beginning. According to Posner, "law professors are 
chattering to each other over the Internet" (about, alas, "atrocities perpetrated by law 
review editors . . . .")107  
Legal scholars will begin turning to the Net (and making the modest investments of time 
needed to learn the technology) exactly when they decide they are missing valuable 
information by sticking to paper scholarship. But when will this valuable on-line 
scholarship begin to appear? When authors have something to gainin other words, when 
the system will reward them for publishing on-line. After all, legal scholars (like many 
others), "are motivated primarily by the usual human desires for security, status, and 
income", which desires produce "eminently rational, selfish calculations."108 Such 
calculations will lead professors to self-publish only when they are convinced that law 
schools deans and tenure/promotion committees will reward them for it. Until that day 
comes, against whom would you rather be competing for one tenure slot: a colleague who 
publishes in the Columbia Law Review, or one who publishes on her own Web page? . . . 
Me, too. Because these institutional pressures cannot be made to disappear by fiat, nor by 
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waving a technological wand, it is quite possible that Hibbitts's dismissal of pre-
publication peer review dooms his proposal right from the start.  
3. The Purpose of Scholarly Communication: The Quality Goes in Before the Paper 
Comes Out  
However, there is something else. Hibbitts does allow for some form of quality control, 
but (except for a continuation of the current informal practice of circulating manuscripts 
to colleagues109) it is largely post-[self]publication. Think back to our earlier discussion 
of how scientific publication in a peer-reviewed journal represents merely the 
culmination of earlier stages of assessment and review. Only at the end of this process 
was a full paper offered to the public. The process takes time, it is true, but the 
manuscript has surely benefited from its exposure to various stages of criticism and 
revision.  
Now compare this to the Hibbitts model, in which the author instantly publishes the full 
paper, leaving it for the community to supply the review and criticismwhich might then 
be appended to the paper, or incorporated into later versions. This system would tend to 
penalize early readers of what may well not yet be a polished paper.110 By formally 
soliciting criticism, which he states he could incorporate into revised versions of the 
published paper, Hibbitts makes all of his readers do his work for him.  
As the old computer programming expression goes, "garbage in, garbage out." Less 
crudely, much of the power of the scientific communication and publication model lies in 
the fact that valuable feedback and criticism is available early on, when it can do the most 
goodbefore journal submission: "The prepublication phase of scientific inquiry, after all, 
is the one in which most of the cognitive work is done."111 What has been said of 
science is true of legal scholarship as well: compared with asking the right question, and 
asking the question right, we might almost say that actually "answering the question is 
just a mopping-up operation."112 An article is only as good as the thinking that preceded 
its publication.113 Simply put, Hibbitts has hooked up his scholarly communication 
system backwards.  
For Internet discussion groups, mailing lists, and forums offer legal scholars matchless 
opportunities to refine questions, expand horizons and to see new connections between 
bodies of work. By beginning the formal communication and feedback process only with 
publication, Hibbitts misses these opportunities. In so doing, he would end up doing his 
readers the disservice of offering them an inferior product.  
As a scholar, I do not want to function as editor and peer reviewer for every article I read. 
Further, in the time I would need to read and comment upon one finished paper, I would 
prefer critiquing several different ideas, each spelled out in a couple of paragraphs. If 
these represented colleagues' early expressions of their ideas, it could be a real pleasure to 
help shape them, and to participate in on-line debates about them. I would not have to 
find and wade through long, imperfectly thought-out papers. For the same reason, I 
strongly encourage my undergraduate students to submit outlines for my review prior to 
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writing their full term papers. Rather than correcting weaknesses after publication, I'd 
rather prevent them prior to publication. For, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Senior, the physician-father of the jurist:  
And lo! the starry fold reveal/  
The blazoned truth we hold so dear;/  
To guard is better than to heal,/  
The shield is nobler than the spear.114  
Obviously, debate and criticism need not stop with publication. By all means, let the 
finished paper spark lively, inter-continental debate on e-mail bulletin boards (as do both 
preliminary ideas and newly-published books and articles on the Science and Technology 
Studies electronic bulletin board in my own field). But let that paper be worthy of our 
time.  
This issue is critical. As technology lets us deliver information ever faster and cheaper, it 
becomes even more crucial to remember that the quality of the delivery system is no 
guarantee of the quality of the contents.115 In fact, this paper opened with mention of the 
tradeoff between faster, cheaper, and better. As an unkind Spanish proverb puts it, the 
monkey may dress in silk, but she remains a monkey. However handy hypertext and 
related electronic capabilities may prove, trivial or poorly-written legal scholarship is not 
magically transformed into crisp, important work merely by its appearance on the 
Web.116  
This is of specific concern in our discussion of Web self-publication. The value of 
improved access is only as great as  
the quality of the material. For all the gains in efficiency produced by being able to 
download material from one's home computer, Web self-publication does not add any 
hours to the day. To the extent that it removes even such limited pre-publication editorial 
improvement as exists under the current system,117 and since its primary result is to 
remove most obstacles to publication (e.g., editorial input and criticism and the 
turnaround time of shepherding a manuscript through the publication process), it will 
tend to increase the volumebut not the qualityof the literature. Even with electronic 
indexing, the reader is not necessarily advantaged by having to sort through twenty-five 
mediocre Web-published articles to find two solid ones.  
This is especially serious for legal scholarship. Unlike articles in physics, math, or 
epidemiology, much of whose meat is often extracted by perusing a few key tables or 
equations, law review articles must be read. Unlike many papers in fields ranging from 
medicine to sociology, there is no rapid way to attempt to assess a paper's value. If I see 
from the abstract or methods section that a randomized clinical trial did not employ 
blinding of subjects or researchers, or that a public opinion survey purporting to make 
inferences to all New York City voters actually questioned only the patrons of a single 
bar in Queens, then I can quickly decide to skip the paper. How can a reader come to a 
similarly brisk filtering decision with legal scholarship? For such reasons, strategies 
which hasten and enlarge the flow of legal scholarship (so much less concise than in 
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physics, with its high speed pre-print archive discussed earlier) must be approached with 
the utmost caution.  
Overall, post-publication comment and revision are no substitute for pre-publication 
thought, discussion, review, and revision.  
IV. Counter-Proposals and Conclusion  
A formal discussion of ways to improve legal scholarship lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, the preceding analysis does suggest a few lines of reform.  
First, in order to improve the value of legal scholarship to its readers, to make it a more 
powerful (and respected) tool for meeting institutional goals of acceptance by other 
disciplines, and a more valid way of identifying talented legal scholars, review standards 
must be strengthened, not abolished.  
This goal, itself, requires certain other changes. Today, effective review is hampered by 
both the enormous number and length of manuscripts submitted to law reviews.118 The 
current situation exists mainly because, unlike most journals in other fields, law reviews 
permit multiple submissions. Though the conditions currently existing in legal 
scholarship would make many scholars from other disciplines drool with envy, such a 
"seller's market"which constitutes professional misconduct in other disciplines119is a 
luxury the swamped editorial system can no longer afford.  
As a transitional stage, perhaps authors would be required to submit to no more than three 
or five journals at a time. Similarly, page limits would also improve the chances for more 
attentive review. A carrot-and-stick approach might be appropriate here: authors 
submitting shorter manuscripts could be promised faster decisions, for example.  
Having thus reduced the volume of material to a somewhat more manageable amount, 
review, itself, can be improved. Perhaps this can be accomplished through greater 
reliance on faculty reviewers and editors. True, this role is not currently a widely 
accepted or valued one among law professors (here, too, legal scholarship differs from 
that of virtually all other fields). However, as discussed above, relying on student 
reviewers makes students the de facto gatekeepers for their professors' career 
advancement. It would do well for professors to dwell on that bizarre fact. If faculty are 
not, in fact, interested in "taking charge," in taking "responsibility for the monster [their] 
predecessors created" by reasserting control over the law reviews,120 then this suggests 
that the law review and its weaknesses are irrelevant to them.  
Assuming this is not, in fact, the case, several options exist. First, more faculty could 
engage in editing their own journals, applying to article selection and editing the 
judgment and perspective which even the brightest students could scarcely bring to these 
tasks.121 Another approach, favored by Lindgren for law reviews at better schools, is for 
faculty to increase supervision, and supply students more formally with the skills needed 
for editing law reviews. In his "editorial seminar model," faculty assist students in 
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reading manuscripts, and conduct seminars focusing on proper techniques of manuscript 
evaluation.122 For law reviews at non-elite schools, he makes the very reasonable 
suggestion of encouraging specialization via symposium issues or even converting the 
generalist journal into a fully specialist journal. This would make it easier even for 
students to gain mastery of a field well enough to make judgments about the value of a 
given article, and would improve the odds of identifying willing, competent reviewers, as 
editors grow more familiar with the experts in a given area. As Lindgren points out, 
"[s]pecialization breeds competence."123  
It would also produce a more valuable contribution. Surely the first few articles to 
confront issues such as the Internet and intellectual property, computer software and 
copyright, surrogate motherhood (or, indeed, the possibility of Web self-publication), 
marked contributions to legal scholarship orders of magnitude greater than did the three-
thousandth article on, say, Miranda, or free speech.  
Ironically, as many other fields confront the fragmentation resulting from ever more 
narrow specialization, law needs to correct the opposite imbalance, its relative under-
specialization. Indeed, growing specialization has already begun to  
strengthen legal scholarship.124  
What of the age of cyberspace? How best to confront the possibilities looming on the 
horizon? Why not begin converting the law reviews to electronic publication? Without 
going so far as to eliminate editorial boards altogether (and, as a supplement to the 
editorial reforms suggested above), there is no reason not to enjoy the fruits of the 
electronic era of publication. Law reviews could add articles to their Web page, or mail 
them electronically to their subscribers, on a "rolling" basis, as soon as they are 
acceptedwithout having to wait for an issue's worth of material for the Fall issue, for 
example. Hypertext links could be added wherever appropriate. This would improve 
efficiency (including the powerful facility for automatic indexing) without incurring the 
evils of self-publication discussed in the previous section.  
To overcome the natural conservatism and inertia of the legal academy, which mightas 
Hibbitts feared125impede acceptance of electronic dissemination, the "stealth journal" 
approach might be best. The peer-reviewed Journal of Artificial Intelligence has been 
able to blunt resistance by: 1) continuing to publish a paper edition; and, more 
importantly, by 2) formatting the electronic version to look as much like a formal paper 
version as possible. Thus, when such electronic articles are printed out, they are 
essentially indistinguishable from copies of the print version.126  
Finally, best use of the benefits of cyberspace is made by stimulating free exchange of 
ideas, at early stages of their development. This has already transformed my own 
specialty, social studies of sciencemuch of whose vitality comes from open, international 
debates about emerging issues, conducted through Internet discussion groups. To be sure, 
legal scholarship and scientific research are not identical. The norms of scholarly 
exchange are not as strongly institutionalized in legal scholarship as they are in science. 
An outsider gains the impression that, in the culture of the legal academy, scholarship is a 
19
Rier: The Future of Legal Scholarship
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1997
more private, proprietary affair, with scholars less likely to float ideas in non-journal 
forums. Yet, perhaps some of the culture of science would be a welcome tonic for legal 
scholarship, particularly now that Internet has made informal exchange so much faster, 
cheaper, easier.  
This is the best use of the power of cyberspace. For, as Stevan Harnad observed in his 
provocative discussion of such activity as "scholarly skywriting." "How many are the 
stillborn thoughts that might have survived and flourished if they had but been stimulated 
by feedback at the right time, when they were still active in one's mind?"127  
The technologies of the Internet are powerful. They deserve to be used wisely.  
Between the time Professor Rier submitted his manuscript to the Akron Law Review and 
the time it went to press, the Duke Law Journal instituted a program similar to Professor 
Rier's suggestion for limiting multiple submission of articles. The Duke Law Journal will 
now offer authors acceptance or rejection within twenty days of receipt of a manuscript if 
the author submits to no more than five other journals, and agrees to accept the first offer 
of publication. Although Duke's program is voluntary, the problems Professor Rier 
traced to unlimited multiple submissions may be lessened or solved if this program 
becomes popular. Eds.  
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Etzkowitz, Entrepreneurial Science in the Academy: A Case of the Transformation of 
Norms, 36 Soc. Probs. 14, 15 (1989); Diana B. Dutton & Nancy E. Pfund, Genetic 
Engineering: Science and Social Responsibility, in Worse Than the Disease: Pitfalls of 
Medical Progress 174, 209-10 (D. Dutton ed., 1988).  
27. Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation Counts in Judgments on Promotion, 
Tenure, and Status, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 829, 829 (1993).  
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28. Leo P. Martinez, Babies, Bathwater, and Law Reviews, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1139, 1143 
(1995).  
29. Harold C. Havighurst, Law Reviews and Legal Education, 51 N.W. L. Rev. 22, 24 
(1956).  
30. Banks McDowell, The Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. Legal Educ. 261, 268 
(1990).  
31. John F. T. Murray, Publish and PerishBy Suffocation, 27 J. Legal Educ. 566, 570-71 
(1975).  
32. George L. Priest, Triumphs or Failings of Modern Legal Scholarship and the 
Conditions of its Production, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 725, 726-27 (1992).  
33. Robert Weisberg, Some Ways to Think About Law Reviews, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 
1149 (1995).  
34. Martinez, supra note 28, at 1140-41.  
35. Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Run Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and 
Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 927-28 (1990).  
36. John E. Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 317, 319-21 (1985).  
37. Obviously, some of what appeared in the quotes presented above constitutes 
hyperbole. Contemporary law reviews clearly do not go completely unread. Thus, while 
there is empirical evidence that, for example, Supreme Court decisions are citing law 
review articles less frequently than in the past. Louis J. Sirico & Jeffrey B. Margulies, 
The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 
131, 134 (1986). Judge Richard Posner assures us that law reviews are, at least in an 
archival capacity, "indispensable resources for judges and their clerks". Richard A. 
Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1131, 1137-38 
(1995). Leibman and White, similarly, claim that law reviews "serve as reference 
material waiting quietly in libraries for scholarships, judges, students, and practitioners 
who need help in solving legal problems and in selling their solutions to the world." 
Jordan H. Leibman & James P. White, How the Student-Edited Law Journals Make Their 
Publication Decision, 39 J. Legal Educ. 387, 397 (1989). Still, Leibman and White 
concede, "No one can say for sure to what extent law review materials are used." Id. at 
398. And, as discussed below, it remains striking that the audience is so widely 
considered to be  
peripheral to the functions of legal scholarship.  
38. Indeed, even Hibbitts, consciously or not, appears to agree. In discussing the 
possibility that faculty assume editorial duties, he worries that,"the outlets for scholarly 
publication would be radically reduced." Hibbitts, supra note 1, at text accompanying 
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n.226. He calls thisin a revealing look at his order of priorities"a development that could 
have a devastating impact on the careers of many legal scholars, not to mention on legal 
literature as a whole." Id. Apparently, frustrated readers would not be the major 
unfortunate consequence if some law reviews were to shut down. Moreover, given his 
thorough dissatisfaction with law reviews as they exist today, this concern reminds us of 
the diners who complained:  
Diner #1: "This food is inedible! It's poisoning me!  
Diner #2: "Right! And such small portions!"  
39. Interestingly, Leibman and White attempt to dispute this singularitybut their own 
evidence contradicts them. While allowing that, "there is something to the statement that 
law reviews are published primarily in order that they be written," they continue that, 
"they are not at all unique in that regard." Leibman & White, supra note 37, at 398 
(quoting Havighurst, supra note 24, at 24). First of all, however, the basis for the 
statement they quote here is, of course, Dean Havighurst who, it is worth remarking, 
omitted the qualifier "primarily." Indeed, Leibman and White's citation refers the reader 
back to their footnote on the previous page, which presents the fuller Havighurst 
quotation:  
This leads me to a remark that law reviews are unique among publications in that they do 
not exist because of any large demand on the part of a reading public. Whereas most 
publications are published in order that they may be read, the law reviews are published 
in order that they may be written [emphasis added].  
Id. at 397 (quoting Havighurst, supra note 29, at 24).  
In the accompanying text to which note 43 pertains, they state, "[c]ritics are correct that 
virtually no one reads issues of generalist law reviews as they do news magazines or even 
trade publications" Id. at 397. However, had Havighurst meant his statement to 
distinguish scholarly literature, on the one hand, merely from news magazines and trade 
publications, on the other, then he would have claimed that "scholarly journals"instead of 
simply "law reviews""are unique." Furthermore, Leibman and White's support for their 
statement (quoted at the top of this note) that law reviews "are not at all unique" in their 
lack of readership, is a newspaper interview with an information scientist who states of 
the basic scholarly journals, "the best read articles in a standard disciplinary based journal 
will be read, at most, by 2 percent of the people who receive it. We found there were 
almost no readers." Id. at 398 n.47.  
Yet, this statement by no means implies that the audience was not an important factor in 
the production of such scholarship (as it appears not to be truly a factor in the production 
of legal scholarship). Nor does the statement that a given article is read by only a small 
percentage of the journal's subscribers mean that there is no appropriate readership. For, 
it is the goal of the author to reach "the right 2 percent" of his field. This stems largely 
from the specialization and differentiation (not to say fragmentation) which, while not as 
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highly developed in law, is the rule in most fields. Thus, as a sociologist of science and 
medicine, I routinely ignore most of the American Journal of Sociology's many articles 
on topics, such as social mobility, which lie outside my range of interestsjust as a 
psychiatrist might skip the New England Journal of Medicine's articles on infectious 
disease. There is surely a price paid for such narrowness, but it is almost unavoidable 
given the volume of material published in most fields; "[i]t may even be claimed that the 
modern scientist need not read any more journals than his predecessorshe simply narrows 
his vision until he takes in about as much material as before, over a more limited and 
specialized range." John Ziman, Information, Communication, Knowledge, 224 Nature 
318, 322 (1969).  
Even in my discipline's medical sociology journal, Journal of Health and Social 
Behavior, I read only a small percentage of the articles, because my interests lie outside 
its leading topics, stress and social supports. Yet I do read carefully most of those few 
pieces which happen to bear closely on my specific research interests.  
40. See Hagstrom, supra note 26, at 35; Jonathan R. Cole & Stephen Cole, Social 
Stratification in Science 90 (1973); and G. Nigel Gilbert, The Transformation of 
Research Findings into Scientific Knowledge, 6 Soc. Stud. Science 281, 298 (1976).  
41. David A. Rier, Publication and Controversy in Epidemiology: Investigators' 
Publication Decisions 164 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) 
(on file with the Columbia University Library).  
42. Id. at 166. One scientist-subject in this research went so far as to describe his 
motivation thusly:  
[B]ecause good things happen to people when they publish. They get to go to meetings, 
they get a little notoriety. I was admired by my friends, ultimately I got promoted, you 
know, things like that. There're no ifs, ands, or buts about it: you get M&M's [goodies] 
out of it, personal M&M's. I'm not here to solve society's problems, although that's an 
M&M if you do something that does solve a problem . . . . One enjoys seeing one's name 
in print, one enjoys doing a good piece of work . . . admiring your own prose, and having 
other people admiring it.  
Id. at 164.  
43. Robert K. Merton, Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of 
Science, 22 Am. Soc. Rev. 635, 637 (1957). See also James D. Watson, The Double 
Helix 94, 94-95 (G.S. Stent ed. 1980) (noting Watson and Crick's joy that Linus Pauling's 
error prevented his beating them to a Nobel Prize for the discovery of the structure of 
DNA.). To be sure, as Merton has noted elsewhere, such reactions can be considered 
wholly normative responses to the institutional reward system in science. See Watson, 
supra at 213-18. Sometimes, though, competitive pressures lead scientists to walk a thin 
ethical lineat best. For a contemporary case, consider the controversy over whether 
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Robert Gallo or Luc Montaigner was first to discover the HIV virus. See Elinor Burkett, 
The Gravest Show on Earth: America in the Age of AIDS 28-32, 34-36, 40-47 (1995).  
44. Often, specialization almost guarantees a narrow readership. Of course, this sentence 
is true in both senses; specialization also increases the odds of publishing something 
which could interest at least the small number of colleagues working in the same narrow 
research area.  
45. According to one controversial citation analysis (computer-generated counts of 
citations to given scientific or scholarly articles by subsequent articles) 55% of papers 
published between 1981-85 received no citations whatsoever within five years after their 
appearance. David P. Hamilton, Publishing by and For? the Numbers, 250 Sci. 1331, 
1331 (1990) [hereinafter Hamilton, Publishing]. See generally Eugene Garfield, Is 
Citation Analysis a Legitimate Evaluation Tool?, 1 Scientometric 359, 359 (1979). When 
the same study looked at breakdowns by discipline, interestingly, it found wide variances 
in the sciences, ranging from a low of 9.2% of papers in atomic, molecular, and chemical 
physics remaining uncited, to 86.9% of engineering papers remaining uncited. David P. 
Hamilton, Research Papers: Who's Uncited Now?, 251 Sci. 25, 25 (1991) [hereinafter 
Hamilton, Research]. But see John A. Tainer, Science, Citation, and Funding, 251 Sci. 
1408, 1408 (1991) (and other letters); Hamilton, Publishing at 1331 (for criticisms of this 
study's collection and interpretation of data.). For deeper discussions of citations as 
measures of the influence of research see G. Nigel Gilbert, Referencing as Persuasion, 7 
Soc. Stud. Sci. 113 (1977); David Edge, Quantitative Measures of Communication in 
Science: A Critical Review, 17 Hist. Sci. 102 (1979).  
46. As biologist Richard Young stated flatly, if the bottom 80% of the literature "just 
vanished," "I doubt the scientific enterprise would suffer." Hamilton, Publishing, supra 
note 45, at 1332.  
47. Diana Crane, Invisible Colleges: Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities 
122 (1975).  
48. J.M. Ziman, Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of 
Science 102 (1968).  
49. See Banks McDowell, The Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. Legal Educ. 261, 
270-71 (1990).  
50. Id. at 271.  
51. See Hibbitts, supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.34-39.  
52. Traditionally, the power of a profession has been defined as lying in its monopoly 
over a discrete domain of work, combined with its ability to set the standards for 
selecting, training, licensing, and judging peers, free of outside "interference." See 
William J. Goode, Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession: 
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Psychology, Medicine, and Sociology, 25 Am. Soc. Rev. 902, 902-03 (1960); see also 
Andrew Abbot, The System of the Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert 
Labor 52-55 (1988); Eliot Freidson, Profession of Medicine: A Study of the Sociology of 
Applied Knowledge 71-72, 77-79 (1988); Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of 
American Medicine 4 (1982).  
53. Abbott, supra note 52, at 54.  
54. Freidson, supra note 52, at 76. Indeed, this itself is part of a wider trend, with 
occupations and trades of all sorts seeking to secure the status, autonomy, and authority 
of professions via emphasis of their putative commitment to ideals of service. For a witty 
discussion of this trend in the funeral services industry see Jessica Mitford, The American 
Way of Death 214-34 (1978).  
55. See Harold L. Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 Am. J. Sociology 
137, 144 (1964); Freidson, supra note 52, at 79-80.  
56. See Wilensky, supra note 55, at 145.  
57. Freidson, supra note 52, at 79-80.  
58. As it has been since law schools originally turned to law reviews in the 19th century 
as a way to strengthen their claims that law and its study were "scientific" enough for law 
schools to belong in the university. Hibbitts, supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.31-
39.  
59. McDowell, supra note 49, at 275.  
60. Id. at 272.  
61. Or, they could abandon the quest. If they "accept what [they] have struggled against 
for so longthat law schools are primarily institutions for training good lawyers . . . that 
there may be nothing particularly academic, scholarly, or theoretical about [their] 
professional activity, [they] could concentrate on enhancing [their] teaching." Id. at 269. 
Of course, it is quite possible that such acceptance will come far faster if the current law 
review system is changed in favor of the faculty-edited, peer-reviewed form in use in 
most other fields. Consider that, when academicas opposed to practice-oriented, law 
professors first "got the support of the university central administration who extended the 
traditional 'publish or perish' ukase to the law school," this victory was "pyrrhic," 
because,  
[a]s the promotion and tenure decisions were channeled through the various committees 
of the university system, and colleagues in other disciplines learned about law school 
scholarship, the family skeleton was exposed. LAW PROFESSORS ARE EDITED BY 
LAW STUDENTS! . . . [This] is an embarrassing situation deserving the smirks of 
disdain it gets from colleagues in the sciences and humanities . . . . [E]mbarrassment 
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devolved into humiliation when law review trashing became common . . . . Things got 
worse. Academics had to fess up to a more ignominious scandal; there is no peer review 
system for the articles that law professors publish in law reviews.  
Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a Substitute for Peer Review, 32 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 1, 3-4 (1989).  
But the problem goes deeper than this somewhat quixotic process of seeking acceptance 
from a community without embracing the quality-control norms which that community 
considers critical. For, the fact that students select articles for publication in most journals 
means that they, indirectly, function as gatekeepers in the allocation of institutional 
rewards (especially tenure) to the professoriatesurely an odd situation. See Martinez, 
supra note 28, at 1141-42. One could well be forgiven for asking, with one panel 
discussing student-run law reviews, "Do the inmates run the asylum?" Phoebe L. Yang & 
Adam L. Rosman, Introduction, 47 Stan. L. Rev. vii, vii (Summer 1995).  
62. See Lasson, supra note 35, at 927; Murray, supra note 31, at 567, 569; Nowak, supra 
note 36, at 319. In this, law professors resemble all too closely their colleagues in other 
disciplines. For, the mere fact that a field's literature is taken seriously, and contains 
many important articles, does not mean that all of those who are forced to publish (lest 
they perish) in it have valuable contributions to add. See Hamilton, Publishing, supra 
note 45, at 1332.  
63. Lasson, supra note 35, at 949.  
64. As has been stated regarding electronic publication in general, "Instead of 1,000 
libraries in the world having a copy of a particular journal, we will have 100,000 libraries 
and individuals owning it." Andrew M. Odlyzko, Tragic Loss or Good Riddance? The 
Impending Demise of Traditional Scholarly Journals, Electronic Publishing Confronts 
Academia: The Agenda for the Year 2000 (Robin P. Peek & Gregory B. Newby eds. 
1995)(also available on the World Wide Web at 
<http://www~mathdoc.ujf~grenoble.fr/odlyzko/amo94/node4.htm1>)  
65. Hibbitts, supra note 1, at 13. High journal costs and the resulting pressure to cut 
publication costs and library acquisitions afflict scholarly publication as a whole. Gary 
Taubes, Electronic Preprints Point the Way to "Author Empowerment", 271 Sci. 767 
(1996).  
66. Interestingly, printed volumes of the Babylonian Talmud have used something of a 
similar system for centuries. The core of the Babylonian Talmud (occupying the center of 
a printed page) is comprised partly of the Mishna. This literature, whose compilation was 
completed around the end of the 2nd Century, consists of curt Hebrew summaries of 
earlier rabbinic debates, often elucidating the applications for Jewish practice and 
jurisprudence of Biblical passages. Typically, each section of Mishna is followed by a 
much longer passage of Gemara, the other core element in the Talmud. Written in 
Aramaic and compiled during the 5th and 6th Centuries, the Gemara's extremely 
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compressed language records the post-Mishnaic rabbinic debates which attempted, 
through rigorous logical analysis, to clarify, reconcile, and apply the issues raised in the 
Mishna. See Eliyahu Krupnick, The Gateway to Learning: A Systematic Introduction to 
the Study of the Talmud 15, 15-19 (1981); see also Zvi Bergman, Gateway to the Talmud 
1 (Nesanel Kasnett trans., Zvi Zev Arem ed., 1986) On the printed page, the vertical 
columns of Mishna and Gemara (with each passage of Mishna followed by the specific 
passage of Gemara seeking to explain it) are surrounded by layers of commentary by 
later scholars. Chief among these are the 11th Century Rashi and the 11-13th Century 
group of scholars knows as Tosfot. Outer columns include, as well, subsequent textual 
emendations, cross-references, and citations to relevant passages in religious legal codes, 
such as the 12th Century Mishna Torah of Maimonidies, and the 16th Century Shulchan 
Aruch, which remain the bases of Jewish civil and ritual law applied to this day. See 
Krupnick, supra this note at 22-23. This remarkable arrangement lets the reader of any 
given page span the millennia, seeing exactly how original Biblical text was interpreted 
and applied as the source of contemporary Jewish law.  
67. Hibbitts, supra note 1, at text accompanying n.234.  
68. Stevan Harnad, Implementing Peer Review on the Net: Scientific Quality Control in 
Scholarly Electronic Journals (visited Aug. 28, 1996) 
<http://louis.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/>, reprinted in Electronic Publishing Confronts 
Academia: The Agenda for the Year 2000 (Robin P. Peek & Gregory Newby eds. 1995) 
("The raison d'être of scholarship is to communicate important contributions to 
knowledge." Compare this to the discussion of legal scholarship, infra at part II).  
69. Odlyzko, supra note 64.  
70. Jack Knott & Aaron Wildavsky, If Dissemination is the Solution, What is the 
Problem? 1 Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 537, 537 (1980).  
71. The Articles Editors, A Response, 61 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 553, 554 (1994).  
72. See Eugene Gallagher, From the Editior, 26 J. Health & Soc. Behav., 4, 5 (1985).  
73. Actually, he is not the only one to make the claim. See James Lindgren, An Author's 
Manifesto, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 527, 531-33 (1994).  
74. Posner, supra note 37, at 1136.  
75. Richard A. Epstein, Faculty-Edited Law Journals, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 87, 91 
(1994).  
76. John T. Noonan, Jr., Law Reviews, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1117 (special 1995).  
77. Id.  
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78. Erik M. Jensen, The Law Review Manuscript Glut: The Need for Guidelines, 39 J. 
Legal Educ. 383, 383 (1989).  
79. James Lindgren, Student-Editing: Using Education to Move Beyond Struggle. 70 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 95, 98 (1994). Of course, rejoicing that there are more outlets than 
needed for one's output is a strong sign that its production is not geared for its putative 
consumers (i.e., readers). We might normally assume that excess capacity should be 
pared down. Indeed, this is what I thought Lindgren was driving at in another article he 
published the same year, in which he called for a reduction in the "extraordinary length" 
of most law review articles. But, no. To Lindgren, this reform would mean that "the 
major journals could publish twice as many articles. [emphasis added]." Lindgren, supra 
note 73, at 531 (1994).  
80. Leibman & White, supra note 37, at 390-91.  
81. The Articles Editors, supra note 71, at 555.  
82. Merton, supra note 23, at 606.  
83. Crane, supra note 47, at 122 (citing Ziman, supra note 48).  
84. J. L. Dusseau, Responsibility of the Learned Journal, 32 Persp. Biology Med. 344, 
344 (1989).  
85. For an excellent description of the stages by which an initial "knowledge claim" in 
science reaches the stage of acceptance as a "fact" see Ludwik Fleck, Genesis and 
Development of a Scientific Fact 111-25 (Thaddeus J. Trenn & Robert K. Merton eds., 
Fred Bradley & Thaddes J. Trenn trans., 1979).  
86. Osburn, supra note 25, at 321.  
87. Ziman, supra note 48, at 111.  
88. Harriet Zuckerman & Robert Merton, Patterns of Evaluation in Science: 
Institutionalization, Structure and Functions of the Referee System, 9 Minerva 66, 99 
(1971); see Ziman, supra note 48, at 115-16. There is also some empirical support for the 
role of internalization. One study of publication decisions by authors in epidemiology 
found that authors sometimes wrote portions of their paper with reviewers' expected 
concerns in mind, and also drew upon their own experience as reviewers when preparing 
their own work. Rier, supra note 41, at 180-82.  
89. For a recent example, see Juan Miguel Campanario, Commentary: On Influential 
Books and Journal Articles Initially Rejected Because of Negative Referees' Evaluations. 
16 Sci. Comm. 304, 304 (1995).  
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90. Harnad, supra note 68, at 8. See also Stephen Lock, A Difficult Balance: Editorial 
Peer Review in Medicine (1986). Indeed, given what was presented earlier about multiple 
submissions and the (over)abundance of outlets, it seems that such publication is most 
assured, and would be fastest, in legal scholarship. See supra text accompanying notes 
78-79.  
91. Zuckerman & Merton, supra note 88, at 95, 98. See also Lock, supra note 90.  
92. Harnad, supra note 68, at ' Abstract.  
93. Id. at ' The Anarchic Conditions of the Net.  
94. Gary Taubes, Electronic Preprints Point the Way to "Author Empowerment," 271 
Science 767, 778 (1996).  
95. John Ziman, 224 Nature 318, 320 (1969).  
96. Steve Hitchcock et al., A Survey of STM Online Journals 1990-95: The Calm Before 
the Storm (visted Feb. 14, 1996) <http://journals.ecs.soton.ac.uk/survey/survey.html>.  
97. Harnad, supra note 68, at Imposing Order Through Peer Review.  
98. Hibbitts, supra note 1, at text accompanying nn.243-54.  
99. Id. at text accompanying n.244.  
100. Leibman & White, supra note 37, at 393.  
101. Which is by no means to say that many of them read the articles, either. McDowell, 
supra note 49, at 266.  
102. What is said here regarding the leading medical journals could be readily applied to 
almost any other field:  
As scientists we want to publish in these journals because we reach a large number of 
people . . . ; the articles in these journals are heavily cited, thus we have a greater impact 
on the field; and publishing in these journals is very prestigious when we look for tenure, 
grants, and new positions.  
Ronald E. LaPorte, et al., The Death of Biomedical Journals, 310 Brit. Med. J. 1387, 
1388 (1995).  
103. Hibbitts, supra note 1, at text accompanying n.142.  
104. Id. at text accompanying n.122, 143-44 (citing Olavi Maru, Measuring the Impact of 
Legal Periodicals, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 227, 23242). See also Richard A. Mann, 
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The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 Jurimetrics J. 400 (1986); Louis 
J. Sirico & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An 
Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 131 (1986); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law 
Review Articles, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1540, 1547 n.38 (1985) (revealing that, of the 50 most-
cited law review articles in 40 years, 21 are from Harvard Law Review and 12 from Yale 
Law Journalfor other evidence of the disproportionate influence of the elite journals.). 
But see Austin, supra note 28, at 829 (discussing the limitations of citations as a measure 
of value).  
105. Hibbitts, supra note 1, at n.122.  
106. Id. at text accompanying n.238.  
107. Posner, supra note 37, at 1132.  
108. David P. Bryden, Scholarship About Scholarship, 63 Univ. Colo. L. Rev. 641, 642 
(1992).  
109. However, this is not a true substitute for formal peer review as a means of 
validation:  
Whether law review vetting is probing, irrelevant garbage, or a perfunctory pat on the 
head by an old friend, makes no difference since the editor never sees anythingexcept a 
list of the names of alleged vetters. Editors can be misled into assuming that public 
vetting is traditional peer review and consequently the piece has been given careful 
scrutiny . . . . The practice is not a reasonable imitation of conventional peer review and, 
more important, is vulnerable to abuses that undermine the already fragile status of legal 
scholarship.  
Austin, supra note 61, at 6, 7.  
110. Also, it is likely that few papers would garner the sort of attention needed to 
generate useful comments, thus leaving most articles without real assessment.  
111. Stevan Harnad, Scholarly Skywriting and the Prepublication Continuum of Scientific 
Inquiry, 1 Psychol. Sci. 342, 342 (1990).  
112. Robert K. Lindsay, Electronic Journals of Proposed Research, 1 EJournal 1, 1 
(1991).  
113. Therefore, in his proposal for use of "scholarly skywriting", a means of rapid, 
quality exchange of insights by experts on new topics, Harnard specifies that it is, 
"intended especially for that prepublication "pilot" stage of scientific inquiry in which 
peer communication and feedback are still critically shaping the final intellectual 
outcome . . . . That formative stage is where the Net's speed, scope, and interactiveness 
offer the possibility of a phase transition in the evolution of knowledge . . . ." Stevan 
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Harnad, Post-Gutenberg Galaxy: The Fourth Revolution in the Means of Production of 
Knowledge," in M. Strangelove & D. Kovacs, Directory of Electronic Journals, 
Newsletters, and Academic Discussion List. (A. Oakerson, ed., 2nd. ed. 1992).  
114. Charles T. Gregg, Plague: An Ancient Disease in the Twentieth Century 154 (Rev. 
ed., 1985)  
115. Indeed, delivery is but the first of many stages before information becomes useful 
knowledge:  
Does use of information . . . mean (a) receiving it and thus getting a chance to read it; (b) 
receiving and actually reading it; (c) receiving, reading, and understanding it; (d) 
receiving, reading, understanding, and appreciating it; (e) receiving, reading, 
understanding, appreciating, and making it the basis of a decision; or (f) receiving, 
reading, understanding, and appreciating it, plus letting it help you in making a decision 
and taking an action (or refusing to act) in line with the decision reached with the help of 
the knowledge obtained?  
Fritz Machlup, Uses, Value, and Benefits of Knowledge, 1 Knowledge, Creation, 
Dissemination, Utilization 62, 63 (1979).  
116. Neither does it necessarily render us more careful readers. A similar point has been 
made regarding hypertext and multi-media in general by Norman Holland in an 
admirably accessible article on postmodernism in the age of hypermedia: "Texts, finally, 
are inert objects. They are inanimate, powerless, and passive. They don't do things. 
Readers act, texts don't." Norman N. Holland, Eliza Meets the Postmodern 4 E Journal 
(visited Aug. 28, 1996) <http://rachel.albany.edu/ ~ejournal/v4n1/article.html>.  
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